We introduce a novel certification method for parametrized perturbations by generalizing randomized smoothing. Using this method, we construct a provable classifier that can establish state-of-the-art robustness against semantic perturbations including geometric transformations (e.g., rotation, translation), for different types of interpolation, and, for the first time, volume changes on audio data. Our experimental results indicate that the method is practically effective: for ResNet-50 on ImageNet, it achieves rotational robustness provable up to ±30 • for 28% of images.
Introduction
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014) -semantical preserving changes such as p -noise, geometrical perturbations (e.g., rotations and translation) (Engstrom et al., 2017) , and Wasserstein perturbations (Wong et al., 2019) which can affect the output of the network in undesirable ways. This is especially problematic when these models are used in safety critical tasks such as medical diagnosis (Amato et al., 2013) or autonomous driving (Bojarski et al., 2016) .
As a result, recent work (e.g., Gehr et al. (2018) ; Weng et al. (2018) ) started investigating robustness certification methods which guarantee the absence of adversarial examples. However, even with training methods tailored to produce networks amenable to ∞ -certification (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Mirman et al., 2018) , current verification techniques still cannot scale to realistic models and datasets. Recently, a promising approach called randomized smoothing was proposed by (Cohen et al., 2019) -it works by constructing a probabilistic classifier with probabilistic certificates and produces state-of-the-art results for 2 -norm bounded noise on ImageNet.
This work In this work we generalize randomized smoothing to parameterized semantic perturbations (beyond p ). For example, our method enables probabilistic certification of geometric perturbations (e.g., rotations, translations), which is challenging due to the need for interpolation and rounding. Prior work on this topic is limited in either expressivity or scalability: Pei et al. (2017) is restricted to the nearest neighbor interpolation and exhaustive enumeration, while Singh et al. (2019) ; Balunovic et al. (2019) allow more complex interpolations (e.g., bilinear, bicubic) but handle only smaller networks. Our generalization of randomized smoothing overcomes these limitations: it enables certification of geometric perturbations on large networks and with complex interpolations. We illustrate the idea in Fig. 1 where we sample different angles and, by our theorem, obtain a robustness certificate for rotations. Crucially, to be sound, this certificate takes into account the interpolation error, which we overcome by incorporating a p -certified classifier.
We remark that to model a realistic attacker, our method also considers quantization errors from limited precision and does not rely on continuous pixel values. This is important as it means the method is sound for pixel values that are integers or floats (which is how images are actually represented). Figure 1 : A network classifies an image correctly, but fails to classify the same image rotated by γ. Our method creates and certifies a smoothed classifier, by sampling rotations.
Main contributions
Our key contributions are:
• A generalization of randomized smoothing to parameterized semantic perturbations.
• The first scalable and sound certification method for semantic perturbations, such as rotations and translations, that can be applied to ImageNet images. The method is general and works with any standard interpolation (e.g., bicubic, bilinear) and types of pixel values (e.g., integers, floats).
• A thorough evaluation of the proposed method on image and audio datasets, establishing state-of-the art results in both domains.
Related Work
We now survey the most closely related work in exact and probabilistic certification, defenses as well as perturbations and certification beyond p norm-based noise. p norm based certification and defenses The discovery of adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013) triggered interest in training robust neural networks. Empirical defenses are a common way to harden a model against an attacker, by adversarially attacking images during training (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018) . However, while adversarially trained networks may be robust to adversaries, the robustness usually cannot be formally verified with current verification methods. This is because complete methods (Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al., 2017; Bunel et al., 2018) do not scale and non-complete methods relying on over approximation lose too much precision and cannot prove true properties Wang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Singh et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019b) .
To address this issue, provable training methods have been developed, aimed at producing networks that are amenable for certification Raghunathan et al., 2018b; Wang et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Balunovic & Vechev, 2020) . Currently, these methods do not scale to train large enough networks with state-of-the-art accuracy (e.g., ImageNet).
Recently, randomized smoothing was introduced, which could for the first time, certify a (smoothed) classifier against substantial norm bound 2 noise on ImageNet (Lecuyer et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019a; Zhai et al., 2020) , by relaxing exact certificates to high confidence probabilistic ones. Smoothing has the advantage that it scales to large models, however, it can suffer from an added overhead during inference time, and is currently limited to norm-based perturbations.
Semantic perturbations Transformations, such as translations and rotation, can produce adversarial examples (Engstrom et al., 2017; Kanbak et al., 2018) . Pei et al. (2017) were first to certify against such semantic preserving operations on images by enumeration. They reduce the Algorithm 1 for certification # certify the robustness of g around x function Certify(f , x, n 0 , n, α, ψ)
counts0 search space by only considering next neighbor interpolation. However, enumeration does not scale to continuous interpolations or fine-grained encodings, such as volume changes of 16-bit audio data. Singh et al. (2019) were the first to support certification of rotations for bilinear interpolation, which was significantly improved on by (Balunovic et al., 2019) . Both methods generate linear relaxations and propagate them through the network. However, these methods do not yet scale to large networks (i.e., ResNet-50) or complex data sets (i.e., ImageNet). We remark that this work is a continuation of our prior work (Fischer et al., 2020) .
Background
We now discuss the necessary background on both randomized smoothing and interpolation.
Randomized smoothing A smoothed classifier g can be constructed out of an ordinary classifier f mapping points in R m to labels in Y, by calculating the most probable result of f (
In practice, it is intractable to calculate the probabilities analytically, hence we estimate the integral up to a chosen confidence by sampling. One then obtains the following robustness guarantee:
In practice we use Algorithm 1 with ψ β (x) := (x + β) in order to obtain the above guarantee. We say we "smooth" over a variable γ or a classifier f when we apply Certify.
Interpolation and rounding Applying a geometric transformation (e.g., rotation) results in a transformed pixel grid which does not align with the original one. Thus, to obtain the pixel values of the transformed image, interpolation is needed. Typical interpolation algorithms for images include nearest-neighbor interpolation, bilinear interpolation and bicubic interpolation (see Appendix A for details).
We denote the rotation R β by an angle β and subsequent interpolation I of an image x ∈ R n by R I β (x). The interpolation step I consists of resampling (the actual interpolation e.g., bilinear) and rounding the pixel values back to the used underlying data type (e.g., integers in {0, . . . , 255}). It is important to note that rotations with interpolation do not compose, that is, R I β • R I γ = R I β+γ . This is because rotation and interpolation with rounding do not commute (Fig. 2) .
Similarly to images, when transforming a 16-bit audio signal, the result can be in floating point space. Thus, it needs to be rounded to be expressible in 16-bit integers again, which introduces rounding errors. Figure 3 : Outline of our approach. We rotate the input by β i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) degrees, i ∈ {1, . . . , n γ }, apply preprocessing, and classify them. This allows us to certify robustness against an attacker who can rotate the input up to ±r γ degrees. 
Generalization of Smoothing
We now generalize randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) to parameterized transformations. We consider composable transformations ψ β : R n → R n , that is, we have that ψ β • ψ γ = ψ β+γ for β, γ ∈ R d . We will show in Section 5 how to handle non-composable transformations. We now obtain the following robustness guarantee:
Theorem 4.2. Let x ∈ R n , f : R m → Y be a classifier and ψ β : R n → R m be a composable transformation as above. If
The proof is similar to the one by Cohen et al. (2019) and is given in Appendix B. The key difference to Cohen et al. (2019) is that we allow parameterized transformations ψ, while Cohen et al. (2019) only allows additive noise. If we replace f with a classifierf , behaving with probability (1 − ρ) the same as f and with probability ρ differently than f and if
Proof. By applying the union bound we can relate the output probability p of f for a class c with the output probability off and p :
Plugging these bounds in Theorem 4.2 yields the result.
This lemma allows us to smooth over erroneous classifiers like already smoothed classifiers. Similar to (Cohen et al., 2019) , both Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 can be instantiated with
In practice, both statements hold with a certain probability as we have a finite amount of samples to estimate a lower bound of p A , p A and an upper bound of p B , p B . Algorithm 1 shows the Certify procedure, which can be used to perform this in practice. The LBound method uses Clopper-Pearson bounds to estimate p A with confidence 1 − α. The given algorithm returns either both a class and a radius r if p A > 1 2 , or abstains from classification. To perform inference with g, it suffices to pick fewer samples and perform a statistical test with confidence 1 − α whether more samples of class c A than class c B got selected.
Semantic Perturbations
We now discuss several practical semantic perturbations ψ β , first in an idealized setting, that is, without interpolation or rounding, after which we explain how to handle these in the realistic case.
Idealized Setting
Rotation Rotations R β by an angle β ∈ R compose:
Many other geometric transformations such as translations and scaling also compose.
Volume The volume of an audio signal can be changed by multiplying the signal with a constant. In order to change the signal x by β (measured in decibel [β] = dB) we multiply x by 10 β/20 . Thus the transformation is ψ β (x) := 10 β/20 · x, which also composes:
Realistic setting
We illustrate the difficulties introduced by handling interpolation using the example of interpolation with rotation. Our proposed method works with all interpolations. Rounding errors can be handled analogously.
Interpolation and rounding error Recall that rotation with interpolation does not compose (Fig. 2 ). Thus smoothing with realistic rotations ψ β := R I β is not enough as this would not compose with an attacker performing realistic rotations ψ γ := R I γ of an angle γ. To address this, we regard the difference between R I β • R I γ (x) and R I β+γ (x) as noise:
The key idea is to smooth out (with rotations) a classifier f ( Fig. 4 ) that is certifiably robust against 2 noise (Fig. 3 ). For ψ β := R β (without I) and base classifier f • I, we can apply Theorem 4.2 to
and obtain the guarantee that for all (mathematical) rotations R γ satisfying γ 2 < R, by using
Because f is robust around ψ β+γ (x), we know that adding s.t.
2 < E does not change the class c A predicted by f . Thus we get
Here, the statement also holds for the specific , namely (β, γ,
which can be rewritten using the definition of (β, γ, x) to obtain the desired safety property
Certification of Classifiers
We next explain how to apply the discussed techniques in practice, so to obtain robustness certificates against rotations. Other transformations (e.g., translations) work analogously.
Attacker Model and Calculating E A key to our proposed approach is to find a good bound E. For arbitrary images, the norm of the interpolation error (β, γ, x) can be large, but for realistic images x ∼ D, where D is the data distribution, the norm is typically lower. To exploit this, we give probabilistic bounds on the norm for (β, γ, x).
In this work we assume an attacker that applies a rotation of angle γ ∈ C. We can pick a suitable σ and compute a probabilistic upper bound E by computing
where U(C) describes the uniform distribution over C. Using the Clopper-Pearson interval, we can estimate a lower bound of q E for a given E with confidence α E , i.e.,
Using this q E provides a sound certification against an attacker that chooses the angle rotation angle randomly. To defend a against a malicous attacker one needs to bound The range C can be divided into small intervals [γ i , γ i+1 ] and subsequently used to calculate an interval over approximation capturing all images obtained through rotations by angles in [γ i , γ i+1 ] using interval analysis. From these over approximations we can then directly obtain can upper bound for max γ∈[γi,γi+1] (β, γ, x) 2 , where β and x can be sampled as before.
We note that these bounds can be obtained through precomputation on the data set. 
Preprocessing to reduce E
Because the estimates of E at a satisfactory error rate q E are still larger than the radii most certification methods can certify, we add preprocessing to the images before the classifier f classifies them.
Low-pass filter Commonly, noise is a high-frequency artifact in the data. As interpolation noise behaves similarly, we choose a low-pass filter (blur) as pre-processing, to reduce the norm bound E the classifier needs to handle. The low-pass filter (i) calculates the two dimensional discrete fourier transform, (ii) filters the calculated frequencies by discarding the highest frequencies (thus part of the noise) up to a threshold and (iii) calculates the inverse two dimensional discrete fourier transform on the filtered frequencies.
Vignetting Another issue impacting E is that rotation of a digital image induces black corners to the image. Thus rotating twice can lead to very large 2 differences. To sidestep this issue we introduce a second pre-processing step, namely vignetting, which sets the pixel values of all pixels outside a circle to 0. This significantly reduces the interpolation error (β, γ, x) as can be seen in Fig. 5 .
Smoothing smoothed classifiers
The only certification method able to handle noise large enough for our setting currently is randomized smoothing. Thus we need to smoothen (Fig. 3) over an already smoothed classifier (Fig. 4) .
Double-smoothing
To do that, we invoke Algorithm 1 twice in order to smooth the smoothed classifier. The Sample procedure of the outer classifier (Fig. 3) , which smooths the angle γ, invokes the Certify procedure of the inner classifier Fig. 4 , which smooths the interpolation noise (β, γ, x). To clarify the notation, we add the subscript γ and to the variables of the algorithm.
To obtain the certified radius r γ we need to smooth γ with n γ samples, and for each of these samples we need to smooth the interpolation noise (β, γ, x) with n samples. While this can amount to a very large number of samples (n γ · n ), we find that relatively few samples in practice suffice to guarantee r γ with high confidence 1 − α γ . The constants n 0,γ and n 0, can be chosen small compared to n γ and n and thus we neglect its cost.
Smoothing over probably certified classifiers Since both the bound E and the underlying classifier are probabilistic in nature, we need to use Lemma 4.3 to consider the cases in which the base classifier can be wrong. This is the case if the guaranteed radius of the classifier is incorrect or the bound E is incorrect. Thus,
where 1 − α is the confidence of the base classifier, q E is the probabilistic guarantee for E and 1 − α E is the confidence with which E was obtained.
k-smoothing
For some data sets (i.e., CIFAR-10), the bounds for E, even after preprocessing (low-pass filter and vignetting) are not small enough to produce satisfactory results. Interpolation noise usually is not concentrated, similarly to ∞ noise. While it would at first sight make sense to use certification methods to certify against ∞ noise, currently, there is no method that can directly certify CIFAR-10 against ∞ noise up to 28/255 to a satisfactory degree for an accurate model. Thus we certify against 2 noise.
Noise partitioning To improve this, instead of calculating an 2 bound E on the noise, we calculate two 2 bounds: E L for the noise on the left half of the image, and E R , for the noise on the right part of the image. First, we split the noise (β, γ, x) into the noise L (β, γ, x) applied to the left side of the image x, and into the noise R (β, γ, x) applied to the right side of the image such that
Next, we estimate the upper bounds E L for L (β, γ, x) and E R for R (β, γ, x). Lastly, we construct a classifier f 1 that certifies E R and then use this as a base classifier to construct f 2 , which certifies E L . Thus f 2 is certified for both E L and E R . Formally, the outer classifier is
where f 2 is the double smoothed classifier (by Lemma 4.3) which smooths the left and right side noise consecutively
where again, f 1 (x) = arg max c P R (f (x + R ) = c). Here, f denotes the base classifier we smooth over.
Benefit of noise partitioning If the noise is evenly spread then the 2 norm of the left (right) half of the noise is 1 √ 2 (β, γ, x) 2 . Thus, we improve by a factor of 1 √ 2 . One can also partition the image differently, i.e., color-channels or quadrants and smooth over each part in composition. The number we need to sample in the case for rotations, is n γ to smooth γ; for each of these n γ samples we need to smooth L (β, γ, x) using n L samples and again for each of these samples, we need to smooth R (β, γ, x) using n R samples. Thus, in total, we need n γ · n L · n R samples.
Evaluation
We now present a through evaluation of our proposed method, showing results for rotations, translations and audio volume change. All experiments were performed on a machine with 2 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900K CPU @ 3.60GHz. 
Rotation of Images
We evaluate the robustness on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) , Restricted ImageNet (RIm-ageNet) , CIFAR-10 (CIFAR) (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) , the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) (Stallkamp et al., 2012) , and MNIST (LeCun et al., 1989) . For MNIST, CIFAR and GTSRB we use a ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) and for (R)ImageNet a ResNet-50. To account for interpolation noise, we use an 2 -smoothed classifier trained with SmoothAdv PGD (Salman et al., 2019a) and rotations as data augmentation. Details of the models and the training procedure is given in Appendix C. Attacker Model and Noise Bound The bound on the interpolation error E can be computed once we fix C, the range from which the attacker chooses their angle γ and σ γ , the standard deviation of the Gaussian used to smooth over it, as well as the interpolation algorithm.
The computed bounds are given in Table 1 . For MNIST, we consider an attacker to perform rotations in [−180, 180] and for all other datasets [−30, 30] . For datsets with small image resolution (MNIST, CIFAR, GTSRB), we only evaluate bilinear and bicubic interpolation, as nearest neighbor interpolation could be trivially enumerated. While it has also been shown that enumeration can also be applied to ImageNet (Pei et al., 2017) , we show that our approach can be an efficient alternative for larger angels. For all datasets we employ a lowpass filter and vignetting to further reduce E. On all datasets we assume that the image is saved in a loss-less integer format by the attack and account for this in the estimate of E. For CIFAR and GTSRB, we used k-smoothing and estimate the interpolation error for each color channel. We observed the interpolation error to increase relative to the size of the image for small images. This is problematic for two reasons, (i) it is harder to certify large noise radii, and (ii) as noted by Cohen et al. (2019) , smoothing with Gaussian Noise performs worse on smaller images. To address this issue, we assume images from CIFAR to be resized to 64 × 64 (from 32 × 32) prior to rotation (i.e., this is part of the attacker model); for GTSRB, which has images ranging in size from 15 × 15 to 222 × 193, we use the same scheme as for CIFAR and for (R)ImageNet (where images range in size from 20 × 17 to 7056 × 4488) we resize all images prior to rotations such that their shorter side is 2000 pixels. This simulates a dataset where each image has at least a resolution of 2000 × 2000, which we believe to be reasonable given current hardware. Thus our attacker model formally is an attacker that applies rotation of γ ∈ C degrees, on an image of at least 2000 × 2000 pixels, that follow the data distribution. For error estimation and classification we resize the images back down to 32 × 32 for GTSRB and CIFAR and for (R)ImageNet such that the shorter side is 256 pixel long and take a 224×224 crop of the center, the common preprocessing for this datset (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) . Values in Table 1 take prepossessing into account. Fig. 6 shows the interpolation errors on ImageNet in blue for all images in red for images where the shorter side is naturally longer than 2000. This indicates that we don't measure an effect the resclaing but rather the image size. Entries of Table 1 marked with * denote the maximal error measured for the dataset and the perturbation. However, they lie just outside what we could prove with reasonable effort while retaining accuracy. Thus in practice we use a slightly smaller E, that still covers 90% of possible interpolation errors. This approach soundly certifies against attacks from an attacker that randomly chooses an angle, as we observed that errors beyond the chosen E are rare and empirically where not concentrated on particular images. Section 6 discusses the estimation of E for a sound classifier. First estimate for these values show that they are similar to the values reported in Table 1 .
Results
We evaluated our algorithm on the non-starred E values in Table 1 . The results are shown in Table 2 : f Acc. and g Acc. denote how many images have been successfully classified respectively. All images classified by g are certified with a radius r γ > 0. For ImageNet and RImageNet as well as MNIST we observe very good results, as these datasets either have very large images or are very simple and can sometimes prove radii that are larger than what we used as possible ranges for the attacker when estimating E. We have clipped these values back to what we assumed in the attacker model and indicate this by † . For GTSRB and CIFAR, the images are yielding higher interpolation errors but at the same time are less robustness to noise. Thus it becomes harder to construct a 2 smoothed classifier for these datasets. This required us to drop the confidence from 99.9% to 99% and apply smoothing over each color channel separately. Balunovic et al. (2019) Similarly to rotations, we apply preprocessing calculate estimates for E in Table 4 . As Ima-geNet images get cropped before classification and MNIST images have black background, we do not use vignetting. Since the interpolation errors for translation are slightly higher than for rotation, we only consider MNIST and (R)ImageNet. On the other datasets the error becomes infeasible large. Also we do not consider nearest neighbor interpolation as it can be easily enumerated here. Results are shown in Table 3 . The radius is given in percent of image size. 14.28% on MNIST corresponds to 4 pixel and 2.4 on 2000 pixels to 48. Since we obtain a 2 -bound, the radius reads as dx dy 2 ≤ r γ where dx and dy are changes in respective directions. Balunovic et al. (2019) certify 77% on MNIST, (±2 pixels, 263s per image). We significantly improve this result.
Translation

Volume Change of Audio Signals
To evaluate our method on audio data we use the speech commands dataset (Warden, 2018) , which are recordings of up to 1 second of people saying one of 30 different words, which are to be classified. Our audio experiments are similar to those for images, although here we do not employ any resizing or scaling. We use a classification pipeline that converts audio wave forms into MFCC spectra (Davis & Mermelstein, 1980) and then treats these as images and applies normal image classification. We use a ResNet50, that was trained with Gaussian noise, but not SmoothAdv PGD . We apply the noise before the wavefrom is converted to the MFCC spectrum.
We estimate E with α E = 0.001, σ γ = 3, C = [−3, 3] to be 0.005 and q E = 0.95. On 100 samples, the base classifier f was correct 94 times, and the smoothed classifier g 51 times for r γ of 0.75, 1.96 and 3.12 for the 25 th , 50 th , 75 th percentile respectively, corresponding to ±1.09, ±1.25 and ±1.43 dB. At n γ = 100 and n = 400 the average certification time was 138.06s.
Discussion
Since the success of our approach largely depends on the size of the underlying images we are in an unusual situation where it is easier for us to prove statements on ImageNet than CIFAR. Accuracy of our robust classifier is mostly limited by the large estimate of E and the quality of the underlying p certification. Thus any advances in p robustness or estimating lower (sound) E (e.g., by computing it per image) directly translate into improvements of our method. The choice of σ γ trades accuracy with certification radius as seen in Table 2 . Finally, using more samples and further splits for k-smoothing, the error bound can be pushed further, at the cost of compute time and accuracy.
Conclusion
In this work we presented a novel method that extends the Gaussian Smoothing framework of Cohen et al. (2019) to semantic parameterized perturbations (beyond l p -balls) in domains such as image (including ImageNet) and audio classification. The framework is general and can be directly applied as-is to standard semantic perturbations with all interpolation schemes while being sound for different types of pixel values. We believe the generality of the method will trigger further work in this direction.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
We present and proof a slightly more general version of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem. Let x ∈ R n , f : R m → Y be a classifier, ψ β : R n → R m a composable transformation for β ∼ N (0, Σ) with a symmetric, positive-definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ R k×k . If
Proof. The assumption is
By the definition of g we need to show that
We define the set A := {z | γ T Σ −1 z ≤ γ T Σ −1 γΦ(p A )}. We claim that for β ∼ N (0, Σ), we have
First, we show that Eq. (1) holds.
(1) holds. Next we show that Eq.
(2) holds. For a random variable v ∼ N (µ v , Σ v ) we write p v (z) for the evaluation of the Gaussian cdf at point z.
Thus also Eq. (2) holds. Next, we claim that for B :
The proof for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are analogous to the proofs for Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Now we derive the conditions that lead to P(β + γ ∈ A) > P(β + γ ∈ B):
Similarly, we have
Thus, we get
Because z ∈ A, we know that
Does there exist a t such that both upper bound coincide? Yes, namely t = exp γ T Σ −1 γΦ −1 (p A ) − 1 2 γ T Σ −1 γ .
C Experiment Details
C.1 Models
We have implemented the training for all models in robustness-lib in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017) .
(Restricted) ImageNet We used ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) and trained with SmoothAdv PGD (Salman et al., 2019a) . We trained with a batch size of 200 for 90 (150 for ImageNet with rotation) epochs using stochastic gradient decent with a learning rate starting at 0.1, which is decreased by a factor 10 every 30 (50 for ImageNet with rotation) epochs. For each batch of samples we apply a randomized data augmentation, vignetting for rotation, and the lowpass filter. After this prepossessing we then apply SmoothAdv PGD with one noise sample (σ = 0.5) and 1 PGD pass (with step size 1; as in Salman et al. (2019a) ) and then evaluate or train on the batch. We trained either with random rotation (uniformly in [−30, 30] degrees; with bilinear interpolation) or random translations up to ±5.36% in x and y direction (again uniformly with bilinear interpolation).
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 50. Training on ImageNet with 4 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6242 CPU @ 2.80GHz takes roughly 1 hour per epoch and Restricted ImageNet 10 minutes per epoch.
CIFAR-10 & German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB)
For both datasets we use a ResNet-18 trained on 32 × 32 images. We use the same pipeline as for ImageNet, but with σ = 0.12, PGD step size 0.25, batch size 128, and lowered the learning rate every 70 epochs over 500 total epochs. For both datasets we used data augementation with ±30 degree rotations.
Training with 2 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6242 CPU @ 2.80GHz takes 36s for CIFAR and 15s for GTSRB per epoch.
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 12.
MNIST For MNIST we use a ResNet-18 (that takes a single color channel in the input layer), which we trained with σ = 0.3, PGD step size 0.2, batch size 1024, and initial learning rate 0.01 over 300 epochs, lowering the learning rate every 60 epochs. For data augmentation we used rotations in [−180, 180] degrees and translations of ±0.28%.
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 8. Training with 2 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6242 CPU @ 2.80GHz takes 10s per epoch.
GCommands
In addition to robustness-lib we based our implementation on GCommandsPytorch (GCo). As outlined in Section 7 we convert the audio waveform to MFCC spectra (Davis & Mermelstein, 1980 ) and then treats these as images and applies normal image classification, with a single color channel. For this we utilize a ResNet-50. We apply Gaussian Noise with σ = 0.006 on the wave form during training, but do not employ SmoothAdv PGD , which would necessitate a differentiable MFCC transform. During training we also perform random volume changes with ±10 dB. Training is performed using SGD over 90 epochs, where the fixed learning rate is 0.01.
C.2 Experiment Parameters
To obtain the parameters for smoothing we calculated the minimum number of samples required in the best case (classifier always reports the same class). These numbers rounded up yields the parameters used in Section 7.
